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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(d). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The two "issues" that defendants/appellants Neil Sorensen Construction and Russell 
Sorensen (the "Sorensens") identify for appeal are both based upon the same premise. That 
premise is that there was no legal basis for the awarding of attorney's fees, and that 
plaintiff/appellee's counsel's attempts to get attorney's fees constituted a fraud upon the 
court. However, the Sorensens ignore the fact that the issue of attorney's fees was resolved 
against them conclusively as a result of "deemed admitted" admissions from (a) a set of 
requests for admission which were not timely responded to (and which were never 
withdrawn or amended) and (b) a statement of undisputed facts in plaintiff/appellee's 
("Ivie") motion for summary judgment which were not properly disputed by the Sorensens. 
The real issue is whether the trial court judges (Jones and Fuchs) properly ruled that the 
Sorensens' admissions required an award of attorney's fees, which will involve a review of 
issues of both fact and law. 
The Court of Appeals should review any conclusions of law made by the trial court 
judges for correctness, but should accord such conclusions no deference. Smith v. Smith. 
793 P. 2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990). Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Ivie does not believe that the Sorensens' statement as to determinative law is 
1 
applicable. Rather, Ivie believes that the following statutes and/or rules of civil procedure 
and/or judicial administration are determinative: 
Utah R. Civ. P. 36 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 
Code Jud. Adm. Rule 4-501 
U.C.A. 70A-2-201etseq. 
U.C.A. 58-55-16 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Sorensens failed to respond to a request for admissions, and were deemed to 
have admitted that they owed the money prayed for in Ivie's complaint, plus interest thereon 
at 18% plus attorney's fees. Ivie filed a motion for summary judgment based upon these 
admissions and also a separate verified statement of undisputed fact that the Sorensens owed 
the money prayed for, plus interest and attorney's fees. The Sorensens, incredibly, failed to 
set forth a "statement of disputed facts" in their memorandum in opposition to the motion 
for summary judgment, and failed to submit any affidavits refuting Ivie's statement of 
undisputed facts. Upon a motion for reconsideration, Judge Maurice Jones found that with 
these admissions (from the discovery and from the statement of undisputed facts) there were 
no longer any issues of fact and granted summary judgment to plaintiff Ivie. 
Judge Jones signed an order granting summary judgment which included interest and 
attorney's fees. Thereafter, the Sorensens' counsel, Samuel King, filed motion after motion 
claiming that fees should not have been awarded and that Ivie's counsel, Brian Steffensen, 
had defrauded the Court. Ivie opposed these requests, and obtained orders from Judge Jones 
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and his successor, Juu^ . .v.u, ainrming me sunn • . udu" ^ • - "\ -1 
ac/icv, .,, j . . . -i-k i attorney's fees. The Sorensens appeal these orders without 
ever having moved t. • u ni :\ i\\ or amend the admissions upon which the original judgment 
and subsequent orders are based, . _ . . . ' . . . h... • t'-.mo 
set aside the iudument and orders herein, the principal, interest and fees which have been 
awarded to plaintiff I vie has grown to in excess of $20,000.00, Judge Fuchs' last hearing 
ana u a , . ;- .^ -i -a *.» *] i - ^nc »u a rded herein 
were too high. Judge Fuchs ruled that the cause of the high fees which have accrued in this 
case was the Sorensens' improper and wrongful attempts to set aside \DL augen ;•„].•; 
ordeis hen'iii 
SI A 1'EMENT OF FACTS 
Ivie's predecessor in interest Main Mice: -:'•• •- • ~s-
f , T.(!,>^ .-,. : • - Sorensens for installation into a home owned by the Cain's. Russell Sorensen 
also purchased lighting fixtures from Main Street. Russell Sorensen signed one of two 
invoices lur ihesepurciia ->. < *-V-HK •** 
interest at 18% and for the recovery of costs and attorney's fees. The fixtures were 
satisfactorily installed in the Cain residence, flu, Cains apparently paid the Sorensens for 
1- .. .' ' ' 'N,.I • , ; S t ree t . 
Main Street closed its business, Ivie purchased Main Street's claim against the 
Sorensens and til. i ai;i:>„ Ivie demanded p i> in .• *.* a-
• itro» n^ Brian Steffensen, in 1990 and asked Steffensen to file a complaint against the 
Sorensens for the fixtures purchased from Main Street but for which payment had not been 
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received. Ivie told Steffensen that there were written invoices providing for interest and 
attorney's fees. Steffensen filed the complaint herein against the Sorensens, alleging breach 
of contract and that monies, plus interest and attorney's fees were owed. The Sorensens 
were served with the summons, complaint and a set of discovery. The first set of discovery 
included a request for admissions. 
The Sorensens answered the complaint, but rather than respond to the discovery, the 
Sorensens sent Ivie a letter arguing that the matter should be dropped and that if Ivie was 
willing to drop the case it should let the Sorensens know within ten days. Ivie was not 
persuaded by the Sorensens' letter, so Ivie did not accept the offer to drop the case within the 
ten days. Even though Ivie had not agreed to drop the case within the said ten days, the 
Sorensens still did not respond to the discovery. 
Several weeks later, Ivie filed a motion for summary judgment, based upon the 
"deemed admitted" admissions in the first set of discovery that the Sorensens owed Ivie the 
principal, interest and attorney's fees as alleged in the complaint, and upon a verified 
statement of undisputed facts that averred that the Sorensens owed Ivie the requested 
principal, interest and attorney's fees. The Sorensens failed to dispute Ivie's statement of 
undisputed facts, by affidavit or otherwise, and failed to move to withdraw or amend the 
"deemed admitted" admissions. 
Judge Grant initially denied the motion, stating that "there appear to be issues of 
fact," but immediately recused himself Judge Jones took over the case. Ivie filed a motion 
for reconsideration. Judge Jones heard oral argument on this motion after receiving the 
parties' memoranda. Judge Jones found that the Sorensens had not filed a timely response to 
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the request for admissions, and that the plaintiil h ic i statement 01 unui^un-
 :.u .- ^ 
ir u- .iii-M'ijiu iiad not been refuted. Based 
upon the fact that the request for admissions and the statement of undisputed facts 
automatically became "deemed admitted' " ' by opci aiK- 11 u lye I n111 • s nil ei 1 il 11.11 I v 11 • 
w i s i' 111 i 11 a I 111 s 1111 > i n; i « \ \ h ;ment based upon said admissions. 
Given these findings and ruling, Judge Jones signed a summary judgment in favor of 
Ivie and against the Sorensens on < - -ir*1 ••'• r fhjK '^> ' ^ ' ' n ^ 
attorney, Samuel King, filed motion after motion tr>ing to set aside this judgment. 
Interestingly enough, when King first objected to the summary judgment, he argued ::MI -ie 
thought that his s M "• • * * ' . sp . nd to the discovery (which argument 
was briefed and rejected by Judge Jones). Now, King argues that he never saw the discovery 
and that it was somehow abusive foi Ivie to serve JI^CO'* u : ^ .^  ,-v. -en;- M ..\>.^ ^.imc 
t ; • ! >• - : a * ' ^mnla in t were served on them. This is just one example of 
King 's inability to accurately recall what has occurred in this case. 
When Juugc rue: . i u u ^ '• •* ^ ^ or:m* -1 
herein, he asked Ivie to submit a memorandum setting forth a his ton of the case and the 
Sorensens' motions to reconsider. Ivie complied by submitting a r i j u - m i - \ HM . MUL-I >IO 
•
u
 '.'•-.'• '• • " -; : ;«: :* ' mzs Regarding Interest and Attorney's fees" to Judge 
Fuchs on or about December 18, 1995, This document plus exhibits is in explicably not 
present in the recoi - . •. ^ pi*,-' -. -V" u ^ l ' x <: ; - n -
cause the clerk of the trial court to include a copy of this document in the record, or submit a 
copy thereof to the Court, of Appeals under separate cover for its review Since the history 
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of this case is extraordinarily long and complex, and this prior memorandum was 
specifically designed to provide a review of the factual history of this case for Judge Fuchs, 
Ivie refers the Court of Appeals to it and incorporates it by reference herein rather than to 
attempt to restate it in its entirety herein. 
Very briefly, after approximately four attempts by the Sorensens to get Judge Jones 
to change his ruling, Judge Jones made the following minute entry on June 20, 1992: 
JONES/SC COURT RULES THAT: 
1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER, THEREFORE WILL NOT BE SET ASIDE 
2 DEFT ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES & REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
WAS LATE & PLTF REFUSSAL TO ACCEPT THEM IS PROPER 
3 DEFT CLAIM TO RIGHT TO TAKE DEPOSITION REGARDING PLTF 
ATTORNEY FEES IS ERRONEOUS. PLTF ATTORNEY TESTIMONY IS 
SUFFICIENT. 
4 PRIOR RULINGS OF THE COURT WILL NOT BE ALTERED. 
5 REQUEST BY DEFT FOR RECONSIDERATION IS INAPPROPRIATE 
In response to this minute entry, Ivie prepared the following Findings and Conclusions, 
but due to Judge Jones' retirement, they were executed by Judge Jones' successor, Judge Fuchs, 
on December 16, 1992: 
Defendants1 counsel having filed "Defendants' Motion for Stay of Execution, 
For Extension of Time in Which to File Appeal and for review of All 
Proceedings", and the Court having heard oral argument on the same on August 
23,1991, and again on September 27,1991, plaintiff being represented by Brian 
W. Steffensen and defendants by Samuel King, and the Court having considered 
Mr, King's request for findings as to its prior orders and its order in response to 
Mr, King's latest Motion, the Court determines that it would be helpful to all 
concerned if it set forth its findings in this matter and then its final ruling based 
thereon; 
6 
Consequently, the Court finds and concludes as follows from, the pleadings 
and admissions on file herein: 
' M i l l l l l i i i i ^ u Lino a c l l u i i in lliC l a t e ^p!MI.. •-- - ' ~ *mw u a S u ! ,1 
>ununons, complaint and discovery (which di:>eu\ay included requests for 
admission) to be served upon defendant Cindy Cam rv . i n") and the other 
1
' Sorensen Defendants'1 herein. 
- niw. .^OIL:I-.n ucienaaiM.-, ai-5v\cred plains " -.,,,;. Aim^ut .nakmg 
1
 -^ntion tnr rri«'n lefinitr Ntat iv:,.--it or to quash DCCauow a n exhibit thereto was 
not attached. 
3 The plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on two independent 
factual grounds: (i) the requests for admissions served on the defendants which 
h.id not been responded to, and (ii) a statement of undisputed facts verified under 
*altv of neriurv by Brent Ivie. 
he Sorensen Defendants filed a "Defenses to Motion for Summary 
•'aiL-mem" which did not constitute a motion to withdraw or amend the 
••issions and which did not refute the statement of undisputed facts as 
red in the Rules of Judicial Administration. Consequently the plaintiffs 
:<iv.,.Llai assertions in the requests for admission and in the unrefuted statement 
of undisputed facts that: 
(a) there were v; a entoieeable agreemmi- between piam.:;; ana me 
Sorenson Defendants WHICH require the Sorenson Ueiendanb to pay plaintiff the 
principal balance due, plus interest thereon at 18% per annum and plaintiffs 
ai'.orney's fees; 
(b) the defendants have no valid defer ises, coui iterclaii :t is oi set offs against 
plaintiffs claims; and 
(c.) defendant Cain is liable to plaintiff for these same amounts (principal, 
interest and attorney's tees) under the bond statute and the theory of quantum 
meruit; were all deemed admitted and conclusively established for all-purposes 
in thr ] , n i " i f i ^ 
5 After hearing oral argument on these motions on January 24, 109]. the 
Court: granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in accordance with the 
foregoing admitted and conclusively established facts, 
6. On or about February 13, 1991, plaintiff caused copies of the proposed 
orders re the motions and granting sum.rn.ary1" judgment to be mailed to the 
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Sorensen Defendants1 counsel, Mr. King. Mr. King did not object to the 
language of those orders or the Affidavit of Counsel re Costs and Fees 
accompanying them, and the Court subsequently executed them. 
7. On March 19, 1991, Mr. King obtained an Order Staying Execution 
supported solely by Mr. King's personal promise to promptly pay any judgment 
obtained against defendants when due. 
8. Thereafter, Mr. King filed two motions to set aside the Court's granting 
of summary judgment, which were denied by the Court. 
9. Mr. King now seeks, for apparently the third time, to have the Court set 
aside its prior granting of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the 
Sorenson Defendants. However, the admissions upon which the Court 
previously based its ruling granting this summaryjudgment remain unwithdrawn 
and unamended such that they continue to be of full force and effect and binding 
upon the Court herein. 
10. Based upon these admissions, the Court still finds that: 
(a) the Sorenson Defendants owe plaintiff the principal amounts plus 
interest alleged in the complaint and set forth in the admissions; 
(b) the agreements between the plaintiff and the Sorenson 
Defendants provided for attorney's fees to plaintiff; 
(c) the Sorenson defendants have no defenses, counterclaims or 
setoffs against plaintiffs claims against them herein. 
11. Mr. King disputes plaintiffs counsel's affidavits of attorney's fees and 
seeks to take the deposition of counsel on the issue of fees. The Court finds 
plaintiffs counsel's affidavits, taken as a whole, to provide all of the detail 
necessary for the Court to determine the reasonableness of said fees and to form 
a basis for the Court's awards herein such that there is no need to seek additional 
information and/or clarification from counsel by way of deposition. 
Consequently, ITS IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that all orders of this Court entered prior hereto granting plaintiff 
judgment against the Sorenson Defendants and their surety, Mr. King, for 
principal, interest and attorney's fees are hereby reaffirmed; defendants' motions 
to set aside or modify the same are all denied; defendants' motion for leave to 
depose plaintiffs counsel is denied; plaintiff is granted an additional award 
against the Sorenson Defendants and their surety Samuel King of attorney's fees 
8 
incurred in this action in defending against the defendants1 unsuccessful motions 
which have not been previously awarded herein from June 17,1991 through the 
present in the amount of $3,412.50 through the date hereof, less those attorney's 
fees previously awarded to plaintiff which plaintiff has admitted were related to 
defending against defendant Cain's motion to set aside default judgment in the 
amount of $1,811.00, as supported by plaintiffs counsel's Revised Affidavit 
submitted herewith, for a total additional award of $1,601.50. 
(Record pp. 546-551) 
After approximately four more attempts to get the judgment herein set aside, three (3) 
before Judges Fuchs and one before Judge Young (of the Third District Court on a Writ of 
Mandamus), on April 15,1996 Judge Fuchs entered the following order after oral argument and full 
briefing: 
Defendants' motion to reconsider prior orders and plaintiffs entitlement to 
attorney's fees, and Plaintiffs motion for an additional award of attorney's fees, 
having come on for hearing before the Honorable Dennis Fuchs on February 1, 
1996, the plaintiff represented by Brian W. Steffensen, and the defendants by 
Samuel King, and the Court having reviewed the written materials prepared by 
the parties, and heard oral arguments, 
The Court Makes The Following Findings and Rulings: 
1. Despite the Court's order and admonition that it would not reconsider 
prior rulings of this Court, defendants submitted written materials and oral 
argument urging the Court to find that plaintiff and its counsel committed 
wrongful acts and/or that plaintiff was otherwise not entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees. 
2. The Court does not believe that the defendants' motions are 
procedurally proper, but given the nature of its findings as set forth hereafter, 
will rule on them any way. 
3. This Court reviewed the record, memoranda and arguments in this 
matter, and finds that: | 
a. The defendants did not respond to plaintiffs requests for 
admission within thirty (30) days as required by the rules, such that said 
admissions became deemed admitted; 
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b. The defendants did not properly dispute the plaintiffs 
statement of undisputed facts in connection with plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment, such that said statement of undisputed facts became deemed admitted 
for the purposes of said motion; 
c. Judge Maurice Jones, having also found the same facts to be 
true, properly granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, including the 
awarding of attorney's fees; 
d. The defendants almost immediately made motions to set aside 
this ruling, and charged that plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees; 
e. The plaintiff filed opposing memoranda demonstrating that 
there were not only deemed admitted admissions requiring the awarding of 
attorney's fees, but that there were signed invoices and statutory grounds upon 
which attorney's fees were properly awarded; 
f. Judge Maurice Jones, therefore, properly denied all of 
defendants' motions attacking plaintiffs judgment, and properly awarded 
additional attorney's fees to plaintiff; 
g. Neither Plaintiff nor its counsel has committed any fraud 
upon this Court, nor otherwise improperly acted in this action; 
h. The amount of attorney's fees and costs incurred by the 
parties in this case far exceeds the principal amounts in dispute, but that is the 
direct result of the defendants' incessant and groundless motions to set aside 
this Court's rulings and orders; 
i. The amount of attorney's fees previously awarded by this 
Court to plaintiff was properly incurred by plaintiff and properly awarded by the 
Court; 
j . The prior judgments of this Court require the awarding of 
additional attorney's fees and costs incurred by plaintiff since the last fees and 
costs were awarded; 
k. The amount of costs and fees sought by plaintiff as set forth 
in plaintiffs memorandum dated December 18, 1995 on page 13 is appropriate; 
1. The methodology employed by plaintiff in calculating the 
amount currently due under this Court's orders as set forth in plaintiffs 
memorandum dated December 18, 1995 on page 13 is also appropriate; 
10 
m. The judgments of this Court are against not only the named 
defendants herein, but also against their counsel, Samuel King, pursuant to his 
surety given to Judge Gowans in connection with the motion to stay execution 
filed by Mr. King and Order Staying Execution of Judgment as to Defendants 
Neil Sorensen Construction and Russell Sorensen dated March 19, 1991; 
I 
n. The defendants were given opportunities previously to file 
any desired appeals, but elected not to do so. 
4. Based upon the foregoing findings, the Court denies defendants' 
motions and grants plaintiffs request for additional attorney's fees. 
5. The plaintiff is awarded an additional $7,125.00 in attorney's fees 
against defendants Neil Sorensen Construction, Russell Sorensen and Samuel 
King. 
6. The defendants and their counsel are admonished not to file any 
further motions in this matter, or be subject to sanctions. 
(Record pp. 1159-1162) 
The Sorensens filed the instant appeal claiming that Judges Jones and Fuchs erred in 
granting Ivie attorney's fees and claiming that Ivie and its counsel, Steffensen, defrauded the Court. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT 
Utah R. Civ. P. 36 provides that when a request for admission is not admitted or 
denied within the time period required, that requested admission becomes "deemed admitted" for 
all purposes in the case thereafter. Utah R. Civ. P. 56, coupled with Code of Judicial 
Administration R. 4-501, provide that if a movant sets forth a verified statement of undisputed 
facts, and those facts are not specifically disputed by citation to the record or to an affidavit, then 
the facts set forth in the statement of undisputed facts become "deemed admitted" for the 
purposes of the motion. Judge Jones found that the Sorensens had not responded to the 
admissions in time, and had not disputed Ivie's statement of undisputed facts in the motion for 
11 
summary judgment. Based upon those findings of fact, Judge Jones had no choice under the law 
but to grant Ivie's motion for summary judgment. The summary judgment included interest at 
18% per annum and attorney's fees because the Sorensens were deemed to have admitted that 
their agreement with Main Street specifically included interest at 18% and for the recovery of 
attorney's fees. 
The Sorensens never moved to withdraw or amend the deemed admitted admissions. 
Rather, they began to accuse Ivie's counsel Steffensen of fraud. The parties briefed the 
Sorensens' claims that Ivie was not entitled to fees, and that Steffensen committed fraud, at least 
eight (8) separate times. Although the issue had been conclusively and irrevocably resolved due 
to the admissions, Ivie pointed out in its papers filed with the Court that there were signed 
invoices that provided for interest and attorney's fees; that under the UCC, even unsigned 
invoices between "merchants" become the written agreement between the parties; and that the 
contractors' statute required the Sorensens to pay the money owed to Main Street/Ivie within a 
certain time period, or the Sorensens would be required to pay interest and attorney's fees. The 
trial judges found that Ivie and Steffensen had acted in good faith and reaffirmed that due to the 
still "deemed admitted" admissions, Ivie was conclusively entitled to its judgment. 
The trial judges' findings of fact as to the Sorensens' failure to respond to the 
discovery and failure to refute Ivie's statement of undisputed facts, and as to the good faith of 
Ivie and its counsel Steffensen, were correct ~ and certainly not "clearly erroneous." 
The trial judges' conclusions of law based upon these findings of fact were correct — 
with admissions "deemed admitted," the trial judges were required by law to grant judgment to 
Ivie. 
12 
The Sorensens' appeal merely rehashes the same old arguments which they first made 
in 1991, and which were presented and rejected by the trial court judges on at least eight different 
occasions. The Appeals Court should similarly reject them. Both trial court judges ultimately 
lost patience with the Sorensens' incessant and frivolous cries of foul — and awarded Ivie its fees 
in having to defend against the same. Due to the equally frivolous nature of this appeal, Ivie 
requests an award of fees incurred on appeal, to be assessed against the Sorensens and their 
counsel/surety, Mr. King. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Rule 36 Requires Timely Response or Admissions are "Deemed 
Admitted." Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 36 is absolutely clear: 
"(a) ... Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth. 
The matter is admitted unless, within thirty days after service of the request... the party to whom 
the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or 
objection addressed to the matter .... (b) Effect of Admission. Any matter admitted under this 
rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of 
the admission. | 
There is no dispute over the fact that the Sorensens did not answer Ivie's request for admissions 
within the time period required. Given this FACT, by operation of the foregoing rule Ivie's 
requested admissions became "deemed admitted." Judge Jones so ruled -- and he was absolutely 
correct. The Sorensens never moved to withdraw or amend said admissions. So, the trial judges 
never had any choice but to consider the admissions to be "admitted" at all relevant points in 
time. 
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B. Rule 56 and Rule 4-501 Require the Opponent of a Motion for Summary 
Judgment to Dispute the Movant's "Statement of Undisputed Facts" or the Same Shall Be 
"Deemed Admitted," Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 56 also clearly states: 
(c)... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501(2)(b) states that: 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or 
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's 
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted 
for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's 
statement. 
Ivie's motion for summary judgment included in its Statement of Undisputed Facts a statement 
that the Sorensens owed the principal balance claimed due, plus interest thereon at 18% and costs 
and attorney's fees. The statement of undisputed facts was verified under oath by Brent Ivie, 
president of Ivie, and formerly president of Main Street. (Record pp. 18-26). The Sorensens filed 
a "Defendants' Defenses to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment" (Record pp. 32-44) 
which failed entirely to comply with Rule 4-501(2)(b). It contained no statement of disputed 
facts. It was not accompanied by any affidavit setting forth opposing facts. Simply stated, it 
failed to dispute plaintiffs statement of disputed facts. Judge Jones so found, and based upon 
this finding, he ruled that Ivie's statement of undisputed facts became admitted for purposes of 
the motion for summary judgment. These findings and ruling were entirely correct. 
14 
C. Trial Judges Are Not Allowed to Ignore Admissions — Judges Jones and 
Fuchs Were Simply Following Utah Supreme Court Law. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled 
on numerous occasions that when admissions are "deemed admitted," and when a movant's 
statement of undisputed fact becomes "admitted," the trial courts may not ignore said 
admissions. 
In W.W. & W.B. Gardner. Inc. v. Park West Village Inc., 568 P. 2d 734 (Utah 
1977), the Utah Supreme Court upheld a motion for summary judgment which was granted 
against the defendant, Park West Village, Inc., based in part upon said defendant's failure to 
respond to plaintiffs request for admission under Rule 36(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In so ruling, the court stated that: 
"However, through a series of requests for admission, plaintiff established the 
requisite facts concerning the agency relationship and defendants' responsibility for the 
work. Defendant belatedly responded to the admission, but under Rule 36(a), U.R.C.P., these 
matters were deemed admitted when defendant failed to answer or object with thirty (30) days 
after service." 
The Court went on to state that the defendant could not "ignore with impunity the 
necessity to respond within thirty (30) days or request additional time or seek a protective order 
under Rule 26(3)". Finally, the Court stated that "the rules were designed to secure the just, 
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." The defendant, by failing to respond to 
the requests for admission in the time set forth in the Rules, had frustrated the purpose of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In Schmitt v. Billings. 600 P. 2d 516 (Utah 1979), when an inmate in the Utah State 
Prison brought an action against the Division of Corrections and certain individual defendants to 
recover the value of his personal property, allegedly taken into custody by prison personnel and 
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never returned to the inmate, then inmate filed with his complaint a request for admission. When 
the defendants failed to respond to the requests for admission, the plaintiff inmate filed a motion 
for summary judgment. The Utah Supreme Court overturned the trial court's refusal to grant 
summary judgment because the defendants had failed to answer the request for admissions 
within forty-five (45) days after they were served upon them and the plaintiff therein was 
therefore entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
In Whitiker v. Nikols. 699 P. 2d 685 (Utah 1985), a waitress brought suit claiming 
that she had been injured by a restaurant manager when the manager took her arm and gave it a 
violent pull and twist. The trial court found no cause of action and dismissed the complaint 
against the manager. The Utah Supreme Court, however, reversed the trial court and required a 
judgment to be entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant because the defendant 
had failed to respond to requests for admission in a timely fashion and the plaintiff therefore was 
entitled to summary judgment. In so ruling, the Court emphasized that "this court has 
consistently held that matter contained in a plaintiffs requests for admission are deemed admitted 
when a defendant fails to answer or object within thirty (30) days of the date of service." 
Finally, in the case of Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702 P. 2d 98 (Utah 
1985), the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant on May 15,1980 and then, on August 
18,1980, plaintiff served a request for admissions, a request for production of documents, and 
interrogatories on defendant. On November 3,1980, plaintiff moved for summary judgment 
claiming that no genuine issue of fact existed since pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the defendant's failure to respond to the matters contained in plaintiffs request for 
admissions were deemed admitted when not answered within thirty (30) days. At the hearing on 
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plaintiffs motions on November 10,1980, defendant filed answers to the request for admissions 
and responses to the request for production of documents and interrogatories. The trial court 
subsequently denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. At the trial, the court found for 
the defendant. Upon appeal, however, the Utah Supreme Court again reversed the trial court and 
ruled that the trial court should have granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. The Utah 
Supreme Court in so holding again emphasized: 
"Plaintiff appeals contending among other things that under Rule 36(a), the matter 
contained in his request for admissions should have been deemed admitted and his motion for 
summary j udgment granted. ... 
This Court has consistently held under Rule 36(a) that matters contained in plaintiffs 
request for admissions are deemed admitted when a defendant fails to object or answer 
within thirty (30) days after the date of service of the request." 
In the Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center case, the Utah Supreme Court simply refused 
to accept defendant's belated attempt to answer the request for admissions and held strictly that 
requests for admission not answered in the required time period are deemed admitted. 
Judges Jones and Fuchs simply followed the law set down by the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah. Once the admissions were established, Ivie was and still is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. 
D. Ivie Had a Good Faith Belief That It Was Entitled to Attorney's Fees. So 
There Was No Reason to Relieve the Sorensens From the Consequences of Their 
Admissions. The Supreme Court rulings set forth above make it clear that once admissions 
are obtained, the parties and the court are bound by them. This means that the Sorensens' almost 
innumerable attempts to set aside the judgment herein were legally and procedurally improper. 
But, Ivie nevertheless sought to show through its memoranda and affidavits that it had acted in 
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good faith when it claimed that the Sorensens were required to pay its attorney's fees, and that 
Ivie had in no way committed any fraud upon the Court. ( See, for example, Ivie's memoranda 
at Record, pp. 187-212) 
Ivie was able to demonstrate to Judges Jones and Fuchs that Main Street supplied 
fixtures which were satisfactorily installed at the Cain residence, that the Sorensens were paid by 
the Cains but did not pay Main Street or Ivie, and that Russell Sorensen signed at least one of the 
invoices (which provided for interest and attorney's fees). Ivie also presented numerous theories 
upon which, given these facts, Ivie was legally entitled to recover its fees and costs from the 
Sorensens (that there were signed agreements, that under the UCC even if the invoices had not 
been signed that they constituted the written agreement between the parties, and that the 
contractors statute provides for attorney's fees if a contractor is paid but does not pay his 
suppliers). Judges Jones and Fuchs found that based upon these facts, and the legal arguments 
in the memoranda cited above, Ivie and its counsel Steffensen had not perpetrated any fraud upon 
the court and had a good faith belief that Ivie's claim for attorney's fees was proper. 
Once Judges Jones and Fuchs became convinced that Ivie and Steffensen had a good 
faith belief that Ivie was entitled to ask for attorney's fees, there simply was no basis upon which 
they should relieve the Sorensens from the consequences of their admissions. If the Sorensens 
have any legitimate complaint in this litigation, it is probably against their own counsel for 
having allowed the admissions to become deemed admitted in the first place, and then for having 
run up the fees in this matter by filing motion after frivolous motion. 
E. Although Not On Point Sorensens5 Arguments Are Without Merit. The 
foregoing analysis is dispositive of this appeal. But, the Sorensens' brief makes numerous 
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scandalous claims against Ivie and Steffensen and is full of misstatements of fact. Out of an 
abundance of caution, Ivie will address some of the more outrageous claims and egregious 
misstatements of fact made by the Sorensens in their brief. 
1. The Sorensens' Claims to a Set off On the Stavros Project Are 
Groundless and Disputed. The Sorensens claim that the reason that they did not pay the 
monies owed to Main Street/Ivie on the Cain residence was that they claimed a set off for 
allegedly faulty electrical fixtures sold to the Sorensens by Main Street and installed in the 
Stavros residence. Although this matter was rendered moot by the Sorensens' admissions, Ivie 
stated in verified papers filed with Judge Jones that Main Street had the manufacturers' 
representative visit the Stavros residence to inspect the fixtures, and that it was discovered that 
the Sorensens' electrician had installed a critical portion of the fixtures upside down. As a result 
of this faulty installation by the Sorensens, the fixture was damaged when power was turned on. 
Main Street therefore refused the Sorensens' demand for set off in this regard. (See Ivie's 
argument on this issue at Record, pp. 193-194) 
2. The Sorensens5 assertion that there is no invoice that provides for interest 
and attorney's fees is outrageously false. Throughout this case, the Sorensens and King have 
claimed in their many motions that there are no invoices, signed or otherwise, which provide for 
interest and attorney's fees. This is simply untrue. At the Record, pp. 196-197, two of the 
invoices are attached to a memorandum filed by Ivie on or about April 11, 1991, one of which is 
clearly signed by Russell Sorensen. They both provide at the bottom for interest and attorney's 
fees . Despite the fact that these documents were filed by Ivie with the trial court and served 
upon the Sorensens and King clear back in 1991, Sorensens against falsely claim that no such 
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documents exist in paragraphs 4 and 23 A of their brief. This is typical of the false statements 
that the Sorensens and King have made in their papers in this matter. 
3. The Sorensens5 Claim That King Did Not See The Discovery When It 
Was Originally Served Is Untrue, At paragraph 13 of the factual statement in the Sorensens' 
brief, King states that he did not see the requests for admission or he would have responded to 
them. King goes on to claim that Ivie did something wrong by serving the discovery at the same 
time that it served the summons and complaint. This is interesting because in the "Defendants' 
Defenses to Plaintiffs Summary Judgment" filed on or about October 10, 1990, King argued that 
he had sent a offer of settlement and thought that this offer had tolled the time for discovery. At 
Record, p. 37, King stated: 
If plaintiff didn't agree with defendant's settlement proposal, it had only to call 
defendant's counsel, and a response would have been made to the discovery. Admittedly, there 
was no written stipulation for extension of time. Those too cost both sides fees. Under common 
practice, for a case like this, defendant's counsel acted reasonably in waiting for a response 
before going further. In his letter, he had asked for a response in 10 days, but again these cases 
are not at the top of an attorney's agenda, and responses are often late. 
From this language written at the time that the actual events occurred, it is clear that King had 
seen the discovery and the admissions, but had simply failed to respond to them. The truth is, as 
King himself wrote, "... these cases are not at the top of an attorney's agenda, and responses are 
often late." King forgot to respond to the discovery in a timely fashion ~ but now falsely states 
otherwise to this Court in a desperate attempt to foist blame for his inaction and dereliction upon 
Ivie and Steffensen. 
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4. The Sorensens Falsely State That King Did Not See That Judge Jones' 
Order Denying a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment Included an Award of Additional 
Attorney's fees to Ivie. Another of the blatant falsehoods contained in the Sorensens' brief 
(and throughout Sorensens' various motions to the trial judges) is the claim that Ivie prepared a 
proposed order for Judge Jones' signature in which the Sorensens' motion to set aside the 
judgment was denied, which had "buried" in it an award of attorney's fees, and that Ivie did not 
submit this order to the Sorensens or King for review (See Sorensens' Brief, par. 25 at p. 11). 
The Sorensens and King filed objections to this proposed order, and specifically 
objected to the award of additional attorney's fees contained therein. See Record, pp. 323-329, 
and specifically p. 326. It is incredible, therefore, that the Sorensens and King have claimed 
continuously thereafter at the trial court level, and again now before this Court of Appeals, that 
they were not aware that Ivie was seeking an award of additional attorney's fees in said proposed 
order. 
The sad truth is that an attorney has attempted to mislead the trial court, and now this 
Court. But that attorney is not Steffensen — it is Samuel King. The foregoing examples of 
King's misstatements of fact and abusive positions should be sufficient to convince this Court, as 
the trial judges became convinced, that there simply is no truth or merit to the claims made by 
King on behalf of the Sorensens. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts relating to the Sorensens' failure to respond to discovery and failure to 
dispute Ivie's statement of undisputed facts in its Motion for Summary Judgment are not in 
dispute. The law requires those admissions to be "deemed admitted." The trial judges were not 
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persuaded by any of the Sorensens' arguments to set aside those admissions and the judgment 
granted pursuant thereto. It is compelling that both trial judges independently reviewed the same 
facts and law and reached the same conclusions. The discretion exercised by them was proper. 
Like them, this Court should also conclude that the Sorensens' claims are merit less and should 
be denied. Ivie respectfully requests that this appeal be denied and that Ivie be awarded its costs 
and fees in defending against the same. 
DATED the 23rd day of December, 1996. 
S2A 
;ffengen 
Lttorney far Appellee/, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Brian W. Steffensen, hereby certify that on the 23rd day of December, 1996,1 
caused four copies of the foregoing APPELLEE IVIE ELECTRIC SERVICE'S BRIEF to be 
served on the Appellants' counsel by mailing the same postage prepaid to the following address: 
Samuel King 
989 East 900 South, #A-1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
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ADDENDA 
A. Utah R. Civ. P. 36 
B. Utah R. Civ. P. 56 
C. Utah Code of Jud. Adm., R. 4-501(2)(b) 
D. Plaintiffs First Amended Memorandum re Prior Actions and Rulings Regarding 
Interest and Attorney's Fees (Without Exhibits) 
Note — Addendum D does not contain the approximately one and one/half inches of exhibits. It 
the original is not made a part of the record by the trial court, Ivie will submit a full copy of 
Addendum D to the Court for its review under separate cover. 
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587 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE i t u i e 64 
(c) Right of party examined to other medical reports. 
At the time of making an order to submit to an examination 
under Subdivision (a) of this rule, the court shall, upon motion 
of the party to be examined, order the party seeking such 
examination to furnish to the party to be examined a report of 
any examination previously made or medical treatment pre-
viously given by any examiner employed directly or indirectly 
by the party seeking the order for a physical or mental 
examination, or at whose instance or request such medical 
examination or treatment has previously been conducted. If 
the party seeking the examination refuses to deliver such 
report, the court on motion and notice may make an order 
requiring delivery on such terms as are just; and if an 
examiner fails or refuses to make such a report the court may 
exclude the examiner's testimony if offered at the trial, or may 
make such other order as is authorized under Rule 37. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993.) 
Rule 36. Request for admission. 
(a) Request for admission. A party may serve upon any 
other party a written request for the admission, for purpose of 
the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the 
scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to 
statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to 
fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in 
the request. The request for admission shall contain a notice 
advising the party to whom the request is made that, pursu-
ant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted unless 
said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the 
request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may 
allow. Copies of documents shall be served with the request 
unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or made 
available for inspection and copying. The request may, without 
leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after commence-
ment of the action and upon any other party with or after 
service of the summons and complaint upon that party. 
Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be 
separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless, within 
thirty days after service of the request, or within such shorter 
or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the 
request is directed serves upon the party requesting the 
admission a written answer or objection addressed to the 
matter, signed by the party or by his attorney, but, unless the 
court shortens the time, a defendant shall not be required to 
serve answers or objections before the expiration of 45 days 
after service of the summons and complaint upon him. If 
objection is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The 
answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail 
the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit 
or deny the matter.'A denial shall fairly meet the substance of 
the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a 
party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of 
which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it 
as is true and qualify or deny the remainder. An answering 
party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a 
reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has 
made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or 
readily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him to admit 
or deny. A party who considers that a matter of which an 
admission has been requested presents a genuine issue for 
trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; he 
may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or 
set forth reasons why he cannot admit or deny it. 
The party who has requested the admissions may move to 
determine the sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless 
the court determines that an objection is justified, it shall 
order that an answer be served. If the court determines that 
an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule, 
it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an 
amended answer be served. The court may, in lieu of these 
orders, determine that final disposition of the request be made 
at a pretrial conference or at a designated time prior to trial. 
The provisions of Rule 37(aX4) apply to the award of expenses 
incurred in relation to the motion. 
(b) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this 
rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion 
permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Subject 
to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a pretrial 
order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when 
the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to 
satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice 
him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. Any 
admission made by a party under this rule is for the purpose 
of the pending action only and is not an admission by him for 
any other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other 
proceeding. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; 
sanctions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, 
upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons af-
fected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as 
follows: 
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to 
a party may be made to the court in which the action is 
pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition, to the 
court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
An application for an order to a deponent who is not a 
party shall be made to the court in the district where the 
deposition is being taken. 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question 
propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a 
corporation or other entity fails to make a designation 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer an 
interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in 
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 
34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as 
requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the 
discovering party may move for an order compelling an 
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspec-
tion in accordance with the request. When taking a 
deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the 
question may complete or adjourn the examination before 
he applies for an order. 
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may 
make such protective order as it would have been empow-
ered to make on a motion made pursuant to Rule 26(c). 
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of 
this subdivision an evasive or incomplete answer is to be 
treated as a failure to answer. 
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is 
granted, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, 
require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated 
the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct 
or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable 
expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attor-
ney fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the 
motion was substantially justified or that other circum-
stances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportu-
nity for hearing, require the moving party or the attorney 
advising the motion or both of them to pay to the party or 
deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable ex-
penses incurred in opposing the motion, including attor-
ney fees, unless the court finds that the making of the 
motion was substantially justified or that other circum-
stances make an award of expenses unjust. 
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(2) Judgment by default* A judgment by default 
shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, 
that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provi-
sion therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in 
these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs, pro-
vided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for 
review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in 
connection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the cause 
Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs 
must within five days after the entry of judgment serve 
upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a 
copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and 
necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the 
court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating 
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that 
the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the 
action or proceeding A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the 
memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of 
costs taxed by the court in which the judgment was 
rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the 
verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and 
filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but 
before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be con-
sidered as served and filed on the date judgment is 
entered 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. 
The clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any 
interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was 
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertamed The clerk must, within two days after the costs 
have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not in-
cluded in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank 
left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment 
docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985 ) 
Rule 55. Default. 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for 
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise 
defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to 
appear the clerk shall enter his default 
(2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the 
default of any party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of 
this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in 
default any notice of action taken or to be taken or to serve 
any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to 
be served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as 
provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that 
it is necessary for the court to conduct a hearing with 
regard to the amount of damages of the nondefaulting 
party 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as 
follows 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiff's claim against a 
defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by 
computation be made certain, and the defendant has been 
personally served otherwise than by publication or by 
personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon 
request of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the 
amount due and costs against the defendant, if he has 
been defaulted for failure to appear and if he is not an 
infant or incompetent person 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled 
to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor 
If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to 
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to 
determine the amount of damages or to establish the 
truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investi-
gation of any other matter, the court may conduct such 
hearings or order such references as it deems necessary 
and proper 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court 
may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default 
has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with 
Rule 60(b) 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimantSc The 
provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the 
judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a 
party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim In all 
cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of 
Rule 54(c) 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency 
thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the 
state of Utah or agamst an officer or agency thereof unless the 
claimant establishes his claim or nght to relief by evidence 
satisfactory to the court 
(Amended effective Sept 4, 1985 ) 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judg-
ment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or with-
out supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor 
upon all or any part thereof 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judg-
ment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as 
to all or any part thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall 
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing 
The adverse party prior to the day of heanng may serve 
opposing affidavits The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the movmg party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law A summary judgment, interlocutory in charac-
ter, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although 
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion 
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case 
or for all the relief asked and a tnal is necessary, the court at 
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the 
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if prac-
ticable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good 
faith controverted It shall thereupon make an order specify-
ing the facts that appear without substantial controversy, 
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceed-
ings in the action as are just Upon the tnal of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the tnal 
shall be conducted accordingly 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense re-
quired. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
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excess of ten pages, the application shall include a sum-
mary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The 
responding party shall file and serve upon all parties 
within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum 
in opposition to the motion, and all supporting documen-
tation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum 
in opposition to the motion within ten days after service of 
the motion, the moving party may notify the clerk to 
submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in 
paragraph (lXd) of this rule. 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may 
serve and file a reply memorandum within five days after 
service of the responding party's memorandum. 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expira-
tion of the five-day period to file a reply memorandum, 
either party may notify the Clerk to submit the matter to 
the court for decision. The notification shall be in the form 
of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to 
Submit for Decision." The notification shall contain a 
certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither party files a 
notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The 
points and authorities in support of a motion for summary 
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a 
concise statement of material facts as to which movant 
contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated 
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically 
refer to those portions of the record upon which the 
movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The 
points and authorities in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment shall begin with a section that con-
tains a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact 
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon 
which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall 
state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's 
facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the 
movant's statement and properly supported by an accu-
rate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for 
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a 
hearing unless ordered by the Court, or requested by the 
parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would 
dispose of the action or any issues in the action on the 
merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing the 
principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a 
motion may file a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds 
that (a) the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous 
or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues governing 
the granting or denial of the motion has been authorita-
tively decided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court 
shall notify the requesting party. When a request for 
hearing is granted, the court shall set the matter for 
hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter 
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the 
matter for hearing and notify all parties of the date and 
time. 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a cour-
tesy copy of the motion, memorandum of points and 
authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the 
motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter 
at least two working days before the date set for hearing. 
Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and 
indicate the date and time of the hearing. Courtesy copies 
shall not be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the 
time the parties file their principal memoranda, a hearing 
on the motion shall be deemed waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty 
(30) days before the scheduled trial date. No dispositive 
motions shall be heard after that date without leave of the 
Court. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and 
for good cause shown, the court may grant a request for an 
expedited disposition in any case where time is of the essence 
and compliance with the provisions of this rule would be 
impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant 
legal issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or 
at a party's request may direct arguments of any motion by 
telephone conference without court appearance. A verbatim 
record shall be made of all telephone arguments and the 
rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.) 
lb establish a procedure for the filing of discovery docu-
ments. 
Tb establish a limitation on discovery procedures within 30 
days of trial. 
This rule shall apply to the District, Juvenile and Circuit 
Courts. 
(1) Parties conducting discovery under Rules 33, 34 and 36 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall not file discovery 
requests with the clerk of the court, but shall file only the 
original certificate of service stating that the discovery re-
quests have been served on the other parties and the date of 
service. The responding party shall file a similar certificate 
with the clerk of the court. 
(2) The party serving the discovery request shall retain the 
original with a copy of the proof of service affixed to it and 
serve a copy of the discovery request and proof of service upon 
the opposing party or counsel. The party responding to the 
discovery request shall retain the original with a copy of the 
proof of service affixed to it, and serve a copy of the responses 
and the proof of service upon the opposing party or counsel. 
The discovery requests and response shall not be filed with the 
clerk of the court unless the court on motion and notice and for 
good cause shown so orders. 
(3) Any party filing a motion to compel compliance with a 
discovery request or a motion which relies upon the discovery -
response shall attach a copy of the discovery request or 
response which is at issue in the motion. 
(4) Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure shall not be filed with the clerk of the court except BS 
provided in this Code or upon order of the court for good cause 
shown. 
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discovery V*0* 
ceedings in accordance with this rule. All discovery proceed-
ings shall be completed, including ail responses thereto, and 
all depositions and other documents filed with the court-BO 
later than thirty (30) days before the date set for trial of the 
case. The right to conduct discovery proceedings within thkv 
Rule 4-502. Discovery procedures in civil cases. 
Intent: 
Applicability: 
Statement of the Rule: 
BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN, P.C (#3092) 
675 East 2100 South, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801) 485-3707 
Facsimile (801) 485-7140 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Ivie Electric Service, Plaintiffs First Amended Memorandum re 
Prior Actions and Rulings Regarding 
Plaintiff, Interest and Attorney's Fees 
vs. 
Neil Sorensen Construction, 
Russell Sorensen, and Cindy 
Cain, Civil No. 903008156 
Defendants. Judge Dennis Fuchs 
Pursuant to the Court's "Order Re Judge Young's Ruling Denying Writ of Mandamus," 
plaintiff hereby provides the Court with a chronology of events relating to the awarding of interest 
and attorney's fees in this action. Accompanying this Memorandum is a set of the exhibits referred 
to herein. Plaintiff is entitled to an order affirming prior awards, and to an award of additional fees 
incurred after July 20, 1992 through the present as set forth on page 13 hereafter . 
Plaintiff Moved the Court for Summary Judgment On Two Grounds (a) the Deemed 
Admitted Admissions and (b) a Sworn Statement of Undisputed Facts. Exhibit A-1 contains a 
copy of plaintiffs Reply memorandum in connection with the original motion for summary judgment, 
which clearly sets forth the two bases upon which plaintiff claimed that summary judgment should 
be granted. Initially Judge Grant denied the motion "because there appear to be issues of fact." But, 
upon a motion for reconsideration, Judge Jones granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment 
(Exhibit A-2). Plaintiff mailed an affidavit of costs and fees (Exhibit A-3) together with a proposed 
"Summary Judgment" to defendants' counsel and the Court on February 13, 1991. Judge Jones 
signed the Summary Judgment (Exhibit A-4) on February 15, 1991. 
The Initial Order Grantine Summary Judgment Provided For Interest and Attorney's 
Fees. 
Interest and attorney's fees were awarded in the Summary Judgment signed by Judge Jones 
on February 15, 1991. Paragraphs 2 and 4 thereof provided that interest would accrue on the 
amounts awarded in the judgment (18% on the principal portion of the judgment, and 12% on the 
costs and attorney's fees until paid in full). Paragraph 3 thereof provided that the Summary Judgment 
included "... attorney's fees of $2783.15; plus any additional attorney's fees incurred in collecting this 
judgment upon motion supported by counsel's affidavit." (Exhibit A-4) 
Defendants' First Motion to Set Aside Claimed Fraud On the Part of Plaintiff's 
Attorney and that Attorney's Fees Are Not Justified. 
On February 21, 1991, defendants' counsel, Samuel King, filed his first motion to set aside 
the judgment (Exhibit B-l). In paragraph 7 of defendants' motion, Mr. King alleged that 
"... defendants' counsel has just received a proposed judgment from plaintiffs counsel. This 
judgment allows $2,700 to plaintiff for attorney fees. It is not just that these are patently 
excessive on a $1,000 claim that didn't go to trial. Worse, there is no basis in plaintiffs 
pleadings, nor its alleged contract, which allows plaintiff any right to any attorney fees at 
all" 
Paragraph 12 of defendants' motion stated the following: 
"It is at this point that the case becomes somewhat weird, for lack of a better word. 
However, it also becomes important far beyond the dollars involved. That is because it 
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appears that the court has been intentionally misled by plaintiff. The matter has to be 
analyzed." 
The defendants went on to demand costs and attorney's fees, and that plaintiffs judgment be set aside 
and its complaint dismissed, as sanctions. 
Plaintiff filed its opposition to this first motion to set aside on March 6, 1991 (Exhibit B-2). 
In this opposition, plaintiff summarized its opposition as follows: 
It is clear from the defendants' latest "Motion for Relief that defendants' counsel doesn't 
understand the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules of Judicial Administration or how to read 
a calendar. Furthermore, the assertions in defendants' "Motion for Relief to the effect that 
plaintiff and/or its counsel intentionally committed a fraud on the Court are outrageous and 
unconscionable. Not only should this Court summarily deny defendants' "Motion for 
Relief, but should impose sanctions upon defendants and their counsel for filing such a 
ridiculously unmeritorious motion. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the judgment that 
plaintiff has heretofore obtained in this matter be amended to include the additional 
fees and costs it has expended in responding to defendants' frivolous "Motion for 
Relief." 
Mr. King filed defendants' reply memorandum on March 14,1991 (Exhibit B-3), withdrawing 
some of his claims of wrongdoing against plaintiff and offering to pay costs and fees. Mr. King 
further asserted the following with respect to interest and attorney's fees: 
"c. The Complaint asks for attorney fees and high interest. 
d. There was nothing in the Complaint to justify that relief. 
e. The Complaint stated (paragraph 21) that invoices were annexed. These presumably 
contained the language allowing interest and attorney fees." 
Judge Jones rejected Mr. King's arguments and denied this first motion to set aside on May 
6, 1991 without oral argument (See docket entry). 
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Prior to Judge Jones* Ruling on the First Motion to Set Aside, Mr. King Filed a Motion 
to Stay Execution and Personally Pledged to Pay Any Judgment Granted Herein. 
On March 19, 1991, Mr. King filed his first motion to stay execution (Exhibit C-l). Therein, 
Mr. King agreed to personally pay any judgment granted to plaintiff herein and sustained by the 
Court. Mr. King further claimed that he had not been aware that Judge Jones had executed the 
Summary Judgment, and charged plaintiff with wrongful conduct for the handling of said Summary 
Judgment. Mr. King also argued that attorney's fees and interest should not be awarded. 
Plaintiff filed its objection thereto on April 11, 1991 (Exhibit C-2). In this pleading, plaintiff 
set forth in detail: (1) two statutory bases for attorney's fees ((a) the UCC relating to transactions 
between merchants, and (b) UCA 58-55-16 which provides that general contractors who do not pay 
subcontractors after receiving funds from the owner must pay costs and attorney's fees), and (2) that 
two invoices (attached as exhibits thereto) provided for interest and attorney's fees. 
Judge Gowans entered an ex parte Order Staying Execution of Judgment (Exhibit C-3), 
stating: "As security, the court accepts defendants' counsel Samuel King's personal guarantee of 
prompt payment of any judgment should such be affirmed." 
Mr. King Filed His Second Motion to Set Aside the Judgment Against the Sorensen 
Defendants. 
On April 15, 1991, Mr. King filed his second motion to set aside the summary judgment, with 
related motions for sanctions and for summary judgment (Exhibit D-l). Mr. King challenged 
plaintiffs attorney's fee affidavit, alleging that none of the grounds therein have any basis and 
charging plaintiffs counsel with fraud. 
Plaintiff filed its memorandum in opposition to this second set of motions on April 29, 1991 
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(Exhibit D-2). In this opposition, plaintiff refuted Mr. King's assertions by restating the points made 
in plaintiffs opposition to the motion to stay execution (i.e., that there are two statutory bases for 
interest and fees, and that there are signed invoices — with copies attached — supporting the interest 
rate and attorney's fees). Plaintiff also asked the Court to grant plaintiff an award of additional costs 
and fees associated with having to defend against defendants' meritless motions to set aside. 
(Plaintiff directs the Court's attention to this memorandum — Exhibit D-2 — as a very good 
analysis of plaintiff's right to judgment and refutation of defendants' meritless arguments). 
Mr. King filed a reply memorandum on May 2, 1991 (Exhibit D-3) generally excoriating 
plaintiffs counsel. 
(Note - the first Motion to Set Aside was denied without oral argument on May 6, 1991) 
Judge Jones Heard Oral Argument on the Second Motion to Set Aside Judgment on 
May 13, 1991, and Denied That Motion on May 29, 1991. 
On May 13, 1991, counsel argued the motion to set aside default judgment against Cindy Cain 
(and related motions of defendant Cain), the second motion to set aside summary judgment against 
the Sorensen Defendants (and related motions), and plaintiffs request for additional attorney's fees. 
The Court took the matter under advisement. 
On May 29, 1991, the Court entered a minute entry on the docket indicating that: "Deft 
Motion to set aside default judgment as to Cindy Cain Granted. Deft Motion to set aside summary 
judgment against Sorensen Construction Denied." Copies of the docket sheet were mailed to 
counsel shortly thereafter. 
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The Parties Submitted Alternative Orders Relating to the Denial of the Second Motion 
to Set Aside Judgment — With Plaintiff's Order Providing for Additional Attorney's Fees and 
a Judgment Against Sam King, Personally 
On June 5, 1991, Mr. King mailed to plaintiff a copy of proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law prepared by Mr. King's office. 
On June 18, 1991, plaintiff mailed the Court and opposing counsel a cover letter and (1) its 
"Objection to Proposed Order Prepared by Defendants on Cindy Cain's Motion to Set Aside 
Default", (2) plaintiffs proposed alternative "Order Setting Aside Default Against Cain, Denying 
Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment, and Denying Defendants' Other Motions", (3) plaintiffs 
counsel's affidavit re additional attorney's fees incurred after the granting of the Summary Judgment, 
(4) a copy of the Order Staying Execution (with Sam King's personal guarantee of the judgment), 
and (5) a copy of the Summary Judgment (collectively E-l). 
The text of the cover letter emphasized that the plaintiff felt that Mr. King should be ordered 
to personally pay the judgment affirmed by the Court herein (see item #4 in the letter), and that the 
Summary Judgment provided for the awarding of additional attorney's fees (see item #5 of the letter). 
On June 24, 1991, Mr. King filed an objection to plaintiffs alternative proposed order (Exhibit 
E-2), an objection to plaintiffs affidavit of attorney's fees (Exhibit E-3), and another set of proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The caption of one of these pleadings was: "Defendants 
Sorensen's Objection to Plaintiff's Attorney Fee Request and Affidavit and Proposed 
Judgment" (Exhibit E-3) It is obvious from this pleading that Mr. King not only read plaintiffs 
proposed order, but understood that it sought to have additional fees awarded and would, if signed 
by the Court, be an additional judgment against the Sorensen Defendants herein. 
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In connection with Mr. King's objection to plaintiffs request for fees made in plaintiffs 
proposed alternative order, Mr. King also filed a notice of taking of plaintiff s attorney's deposition. 
On July 9, 1991, plaintiff filed its "Reply to "Defendants Sorensen's Objection to Plaintiffs 
Attorney Fee Request and Affidavit and Proposed Judgment" (Exhibit E-4) and its Motion for 
Protective Order (Exhibit E-5). Attached to the Motion for Protective Order was an affidavit of 
counsel containing detailed time records supporting all attorney's fees awarded and/or sought in the 
new proposed Order. The Reply memorandum addressed specifically the issue of the new award of 
attorney's fees that plaintiff was seeking in its proposed order. The Reply memorandum also argued 
that Mr. King, as the surety in connection with the Order to Stay Execution, should be ordered to pay 
the judgment herein. 
On July 26, 1991, plaintiffs counsel received a telephone call from Judge Jones' clerk, Sally, 
in which she indicated that Judge Jones had signed plaintiffs proposed alternative order on June 21, 
1991 (Exhibit E-6) and would not sign any further orders in this case. 
Plaintiff Sent Out a Notice of Judgment Defendant Filed Another Motion to Stay 
Execution (Essentially a Third Motion to Set Aside Judgment). 
On or about August 7, 1991, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Judgment and mailed the same to Mr. 
King (Exhibit F-l). 
On August 13, 1991, defendants filed "Defendants' Motion for Stay of Execution, For 
Extension of Time in Which to File Appeal, and for Review of All Proceedings." (Exhibit F-2) This 
pleading alleged, among other things, (1) that plaintiff hid from the Court and Mr. King the fact that 
the proposed alternative order prepared by plaintiff and signed by Judge Jones on June 21, 1991 
(Exhibit E-6) provided for an award of attorney's fees, (2) that said Order is not a "Judgment,", (3) 
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there is no basis for attorney's fees, and (4) even if attorney's fees are awarded, those fees should not 
include fees for matters in which plaintiff did not prevail. 
On August 15, 1991, plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Stay Execution (Exhibit F-3). Plaintiff disputed every argument made by Mr. King — except the 
assertion that plaintiff should only be entitled to an award of attorney's fees for matters upon which 
plaintiff prevailed. Plaintiff therefore attached a new affidavit of counsel re attorney's fees which 
subtracted approximately $1800 in attorney's fees (Exhibit F-4). 
Judge Jones Refused to Modify Prior Orders, Or To Entertain Additional Motions, But 
Mr. King Demanded That Judge Jones Recuse Himself. The parties appeared before Judge Jones 
on August 23, 1991, and were told that Judge Jones would not alter any prior orders and that the 
parties would have to either settle the case or take it up on appeal. (See minute entry for August 23, 
1991) 
On August 23, 1991, Mr. King hand-delivered a letter to Judge Jones (Exhibit G-l) accusing 
him of being part of the problem, making additional allegations of wrongdoing against plaintiffs 
counsel, and asking Judge Jones to enter findings of fact or recuse himself. 
Mr. King Obtained a Hearing Date and Filed a "Statement of Pending Issues" Which 
Essentially Constituted a Fourth Request to Set Aside the Court's Prior Rulings. 
The plaintiff received a notice from Mr. King that a hearing was scheduled for September 19, 
1991, together with a "Statement of Pending Issues." (Exhibit H-l) Plaintiff filed an opposing 
memorandum (Exhibit H-2) which argued that said Statement of Pending Issues sought to raise 
matters (for the fourth time) previously determined by the court and with respect to which there were 
no pending motions. Plaintiff requested an award of additional attorney's fees. 
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Judge Jones Heard Argument on Mr. King's Request to Revisit AH Issues, and On 
Plaintiffs Request for Additional Attorney's Fees, On September 27, 1991. 
The September 19, 1991 hearing was continued to September 27, 1991. Judge Jones heard 
argument as to all of Mr. King's claims of wrongdoing by plaintiff and plaintiffs counsel, and on 
plaintiff s request for additional attorney's fees. In this regard, plaintiff indicated that it would agree 
to a reduction of $1800 in attorney's fees for matters upon which plaintiff had not prevailed, but that 
additional substantial attorney's fees had been incurred in opposing Mr. King's various motions which 
should be awarded. Judge Jones indicated that he would take the matter under advisement and enter 
findings of fact. (See minute entry for September 27, 1991). 
Defendant wrote a letter to Judge Jones on or about November 21, 1991 (Exhibit 1-1). 
Plaintiff wrote a responsive letter to Judge Jones on or about November 27, 1991. (Exhibit 1-2) 
Judge Jones Entered a Minute Entry Affirming All Prior Orders, Denying AH Motions 
to Reconsider and Directing Plaintiff to Prepare Findings of Fact. 
On June 30, 1992, Judge Jones entered the following minute entry: 
JONES/SC COURT RULES THAT: 
1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER, THEREFORE WILL NOT BE SET 
ASIDE. 
2 DEFT ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES & REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
WAS LATE & PLTF REFUSSAL TO ACCEPT THEM IS PROPER. 
3 DEFT CLAIM TO RIGHT TO TAKE DEPOSITION REGARDING PLTF 
ATTORNEY FEES IS ERRONEOUS. PLTF ATTORNEY TESTIMONY IS 
SUFFICIENT. 
4 PRIOR RULINGS OF THE COURT WILL NOT BE ALTERED. 
5 REQUEST BY DEFT FOR RECONSIDERATION IS INAPPROPRIATE 
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PLTF COUNSEL TO SUBMIT FINDINGS & ORDER FOR SIGNATURE 
PLTF & DEFT COUNSEL NOTIFIED BY PHONE OF RULINGS 
When Judge Jones ailed in this fashion, Mr King had made every claim of wrongdoing which 
he has continued to assert thereafter and through the present time — all of which were specifically and 
emphatically rejected by Judge Jones. 
Plaintiff Prepared a Proposed Order Pursuant to Judge Jones' Minute Entry, Which 
Provided For an Additional Award of Attorney's Fees. 
Plaintiff prepared and served on defendants a proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Order (Exhibit J-l). Defendants filed an Objection to this proposed Order (Exhibit J-2) 
which amounted to a fifth motion to set aside. Plaintiff replied to the same (Exhibit J-3). 
Judge Fuchs Heard Oral Argument on November 5, 1992, and Ruled That He Would 
Not Revisit the Prior Orders of Judges Grant and Jones, But Would Sign the Proposed Order 
Unless the Parties Could Stipulate to Modifications Thereto. 
On November 5, 1992, Judge Fuchs heard oral argument from the parties (in essence a fifth 
"motion to set aside judgment" argument from Mr. King). Judge Fuchs indicated that he would sign 
the proposed order unless the parties could stipulate to a modified order within ten days thereof (See 
minute entry for November 5, 1992). 
The order was signed on December 16, 1992 — which granted the plaintiff an additional award 
of $1,601.50 in attorney's fees (after setting off $1811 in fees) for attorney's fees incurred through 
July 20, 1992. 
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Plaintiff Attempted to Execute Upon This Judgment But Defendants Thwarted 
Plaintiffs Attempts For Three Years. 
On or about December 10, 1993, plaintiff filed a First Amended Notice of Judgment (Exhibit 
K-l) and sought to execute thereon. But, defendants filed an Ex Parte Motion to Stay Execution 
(Exhibit K-2) which again in essence sought reconsideration (for the sixth time) of all prior orders 
and accused plaintiffs attorney of various misconduct. Plaintiff opposed the motion. Judge Fuchs 
denied the motion after hearing argument on January 13, 1994, stating that "IF DEFT WANTS TO 
APPEAL CASE HE MAY POST BOND TWICE THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT." (See 
minute entry for January 13, 1994) 
Rather than file an appeal, Mr. King filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus with the Third 
District Court (essentially a seventh motion to set aside). The parties tried unsuccessfully to negotiate 
a settlement. Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Notice of Judgment in the Spring of 1995 (Exhibit 
K-3) which recomputed accrued interest on prior awards of principal, interest and attorney's fees 
herein up through the date of the notice. 
The Defendant filed a motion for stay of execution in this court (essentially an eighth motion 
to set aside). PlaintiflF filed a motion for an award of additional attorney's fees (Exhibit K-4). Judge 
Young denied defendants' petition for writ of mandamus. Judge Fuchs entered the instant order 
indicating that he would not revisit the granting of summary judgment herein, but would review the 
amount of interest and attorney's fees awarded herein (Exhibit K-5). 
Plaintiff is Entitled to an Affirmation of All Prior Awards of Interest and Attorney's 
Fees, and to an Additional Award of Attorney's Fees as Requested in PlaintifTs Pending 
Motion For Fees. Plaintiffs position is very simple. Plaintiff was entitled to the Summary Judgment 
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entered in February of 1990, which provided for interest on principal at 18%, and interest on costs 
and fees at 12%, and which awarded attorney's fees and provided for the subsequent award of 
attorney's fees in collecting the same. PlaintiflFhas been required to successfully oppose at least eight 
separate motions attempting to set aside the summary judgment. The Order signed by Judge Fuchs 
on December 26, 1992 awarded plaintiff additional attorney's fees incurred up through July 20, 1992. 
This Court should afBrm these prior awards, award additioanl attorney's fees and allow interest 
thereon as set forth below. 
The Court has already awarded a judgment for the following: 
On February 15, 1991: 
1. 947.44 in principal; 
2. Interest on said principal amount at 18% per annum from April 4, 1989 
until February 26, 1991 in the amount of $323.06 plus interest on said principal 
amount at 18% per annum thereafter until paid in full; 
3. Costs of $44,25 and attorney's fees of $2783.15; plus any additional 
attorney's fees incurred in collecting this judgment upon motion supported by 
counsel's affidavit; 
4. With interest on the costs and attorney's fees awarded at 12% per annum 
from the date of judgment until paid in full. 
And a separate judgment against Russell Sorensen for $65.86 plus interest 
thereon at 18% from March 23, 1989 until paid in full. 
On June 2L 1991. 
This Judgment was increased by the award of an additional $3875.00 in 
attorney's fees in connection with the Court's denial of defendants' motions to set 
aside summary judgment. 
On December 16. 1992. 
This judgment was increased again by the award of an additional $1601.50 in 
attorney's fees in connection with the Court's entry of it s Findings of Fact and 
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Conclusions of Law and Order. 
WHICH JUDGMENTS SAMUEL KING WAS ALSO ORDERED TO PAY, AS SURETY, 
in the orders dated July 21, 1991 and December 16, 1992 (See Exhibit K-3). 
Plaintiffs current motion for attorney's fees asks for an award of additional fees incurred 
from July 20, 1992 through July 5, 1995 in the amount of $5,325.00 (see Declaration of Brian 
Steffensen in Exhibt K-4). 
Plaintiff should also be awarded fees incurred from July 5,1995 through the hearing on 
this matter which will amount to at least 12 hours in attending hearings, reviewing documents, 
preparing this memorandum and arguing this motion on January 2, 1996, for an additional $1800.00, 
which will be supported by an affidavit of counsel to be submitted on January 2. 
Therefore total interest and attorney's fees are as follows: 
$ 947.44 (principal) 
+ 1320.72 (interest on principal at 18%) 
+ 2827.40 (44.25 + 2783.15) (original costs and fees) 
+ 1655.87 (interest at 12% on cost and fees from 2/15/91) 
+ 3875.00 (additional fees awarded on 7/21/91) 
+ 2067.94 (interest at 12% on additional fees awarded from 7/21/91) 
+ 1601.50 (additional fees awarded on 12/16/92) 
+ 585.02 (interest on additional fees awarded from 12/16/92) 
+ 68.86 (principal amount of judgment against Russell Sorenson) 
+ 80.31 (interest at 18% on judgment against Russell Sorenson) 
+ 5325.00 (additional fees asked for from 7/20/92 to 7/5/95) 
+ 1800.00 (additional fees asked for from 7/5/95 to \I2I96) 
(Interest on all awards has been recomputed to determine the total amount due hereunder as 
of January 2, 1996.) 
Totalling:S22155.06 
DATED the 18th day of December, 1995. 
\//r'y- -f'v 
Brian wj Steffensen ' ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff •" 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the / ^ " d a y of TlcrXHARZ- , ^ftC I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be hand-delivered to the following individuals: 
Samuel King 
2120 South 1300 East, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
FAX 486-3753 
M 
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